G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11869
DP11869 Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets
Daniel Ferreira; Radoslawa Nikolowa
发表日期2017-02-22
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We show that adverse selection in the labor market may generate negative assortative matching of workers and firms. In a model in which employers asymmetrically learn about the ability of their workers, high-productivity firms poach mediocre workers, whereas low-productivity firms retain high-ability workers. We show that this flipping property is caused by information asymmetry alone. Our model has a number of positive and normative predictions: External promotions are not an indication of high talent, within-job wage growth is higher in industries with more revenue dispersion, and non-compete clauses are inefficient in industries with significant firm heterogeneity.
主题Financial Economics ; Labour Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11869
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540682
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Daniel Ferreira,Radoslawa Nikolowa. DP11869 Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets. 2017.
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