| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11869 |
| DP11869 Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets | |
| Daniel Ferreira; Radoslawa Nikolowa | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-02-22 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that adverse selection in the labor market may generate negative assortative matching of workers and firms. In a model in which employers asymmetrically learn about the ability of their workers, high-productivity firms poach mediocre workers, whereas low-productivity firms retain high-ability workers. We show that this flipping property is caused by information asymmetry alone. Our model has a number of positive and normative predictions: External promotions are not an indication of high talent, within-job wage growth is higher in industries with more revenue dispersion, and non-compete clauses are inefficient in industries with significant firm heterogeneity. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Labour Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11869 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540682 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Ferreira,Radoslawa Nikolowa. DP11869 Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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