| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11870 |
| DP11870 Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence | |
| Daniel Ferreira; Miguel Ferreira; Beatriz Mariano | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-02-22 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We find that the number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by approximately 24% following nancial covenant violations in credit agreements. Most of these new directors are linked to creditors. Firms with stronger lending relationships with their creditors appoint more new directors in response to covenant violations than firms without such relationships. Moreover, firms that appoint new directors after violations are more likely to issue new equity and decrease CEO cash compensation than firms without such appointments. We conclude that a firm's board composition, governance, and policies are shaped by current and past credit agreements. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11870 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540683 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Ferreira,Miguel Ferreira,Beatriz Mariano. DP11870 Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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