| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11879 |
| DP11879 ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS | |
| Henrik Horn; Thomas Tangerås | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-02-25 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the optimal design and implications of international investment agreements. These are ubiquitous, potent and heavily criticized state-to-state treaties that protect foreign investors against host country policies. Optimal agreements cause national but not global underregulation ("regulatory chill"). The incentives to form agreements and their distributional consequences depend on countries. unilateral commitment possibilities and the direction of investment flows. Foreign investors benefit from agreements between developed countries at the expense of the rest of society, but not in the case of agreements between developed and developing countries. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Foreign direct investment Expropriation International investment agreements Regulatory chill |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11879 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540691 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Henrik Horn,Thomas Tangerås. DP11879 ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS. 2017. |
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