G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11879
DP11879 ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
Henrik Horn; Thomas Tangerås
发表日期2017-02-25
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We analyze the optimal design and implications of international investment agreements. These are ubiquitous, potent and heavily criticized state-to-state treaties that protect foreign investors against host country policies. Optimal agreements cause national but not global underregulation ("regulatory chill"). The incentives to form agreements and their distributional consequences depend on countries. unilateral commitment possibilities and the direction of investment flows. Foreign investors benefit from agreements between developed countries at the expense of the rest of society, but not in the case of agreements between developed and developing countries.
主题International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词Foreign direct investment Expropriation International investment agreements Regulatory chill
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11879
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540691
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Henrik Horn,Thomas Tangerås. DP11879 ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS. 2017.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Henrik Horn]的文章
[Thomas Tangerås]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Henrik Horn]的文章
[Thomas Tangerås]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Henrik Horn]的文章
[Thomas Tangerås]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。