G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11880
DP11880 Political Specialization
Kevin Sheedy; Bernardo Guimaraes
发表日期2017-02-27
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要This paper presents a theory of political specialization in which some countries uphold the rule of law while others consciously choose not to do so, even though they are ex ante identical. This is borne out of two key insights: for incumbents in each country, (i) the first steps to the rule of law have the greatest private cost, and (ii) steps taken by some countries in the direction of the rule of law make it less attractive for others to follow the same path. The world equilibrium features a symbiotic relationship between despotic and rule-of-law economies: by producing technology-intensive goods that require protection of property rights, rule-of-law economies raise the relative price of natural resources and increase incentives for despotism in other countries; while the choice of despotism entails a positive externality because cheap oil makes the rule of law more attractive elsewhere in the world.
主题Macroeconomics and Growth
关键词Rule of law Power sharing International trade Resource curse Development
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11880
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540692
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kevin Sheedy,Bernardo Guimaraes. DP11880 Political Specialization. 2017.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Kevin Sheedy]的文章
[Bernardo Guimaraes]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Kevin Sheedy]的文章
[Bernardo Guimaraes]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Kevin Sheedy]的文章
[Bernardo Guimaraes]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。