| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11898 |
| DP11898 Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence | |
| Andreas Roider; Gerd Muehlheusser; Lydia Mechtenberg | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-10 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised worries about fraudulent claims by low-productivity employees. We study these issues in a theory-guided lab experiment. Easily attainable ("belief-based") protection indeed leads to more reports, both truthful and fraudulent. Fraudulent claims dilute prosecutors' incentives to investigate, and thereby hamper deterrence. These effects are ameliorated under more stringent ("fact-based") protection. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate fraud Corruption Whistle-blowing Business ethics Cheap-talk games Lab experiment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11898 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540710 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andreas Roider,Gerd Muehlheusser,Lydia Mechtenberg. DP11898 Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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