| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11904 |
| DP11904 Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation | |
| Elisabetta Iossa; Yeon-Koo Che; Patrick Rey | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-12 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Procuring an innovation involves motivating a research effort to generate a new idea and then implementing that idea effciently. If research efforts are unverifiable and implementation costs are private information, a trade-ooff arises between the two objectives. The optimal mechanism resolves the tradeoff via two instruments: a monetary prize and a contract to implement the project. The optimal mechanism favors the innovator in contract allocation when the value of innovation is above a certain threshold, and handicaps the innovator in contract allocation when the value of innovation is below that threshold. A monetary prize is employed as an additional incentive but only when the value of innovation is suffciently high. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Contract rights Inducement prizes Innovation Procurement and r&d |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11904 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540715 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Elisabetta Iossa,Yeon-Koo Che,Patrick Rey. DP11904 Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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