| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11931 |
| DP11931 Samaritan Bundles: Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects | |
| Thierry Verdier; Gani Aldashev; Marco Marini | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We build a model with non-governmental organizations competing through fundraising for donations and choosing their project types. Donors’ willingness to give differs across project types. Each NGO chooses whether to compete in the larger donation market or to monopolize the smaller one. The resulting equilibrium configuration crucially depends on the asymmetry in potential donation market size and on donors’ perceived substitutability or complementarity between giving to two different projects. We analyze the welfare properties of the decentralized equilibrum and characterize the conditions under which such equilibrium is inefficient. We also develop a variant of the model with inter-temporal choices of NGOs, analyze settings where NGOs can coordinate their fundraising activities and/or project type choices, extend the model to allow for spillovers between NGO fundraising activities, and illustrate the mechanisms of the model with several case studies. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Non-governmental organizations Fundraising Foreign aid Clustering |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11931 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540743 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Verdier,Gani Aldashev,Marco Marini. DP11931 Samaritan Bundles: Inefficient Clustering in NGO Projects. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
