| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP11933
|
| DP11933 Blockholder Voting |
| Heski Bar-Isaac; Joel Shapiro
|
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-23
|
| 出版年 | 2017
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | By introducing a shareholder with many votes (a blockholder) to a standard model of voting, we uncover several striking results. First, if a blockholder is unbiased, she may not vote with all of her shares. This is efficient, as it prevents her vote from drowning out the information provided by other votes. Second, if this blockholder can announce her vote before the vote takes place, other shareholders may ignore their information and vote with the blockholder to support her superior information. Third, if the blockholder is biased, some shareholders will try to counter the blockholder's vote. The results are robust to allowing for information acquisition and trade. This suggests that regulations discouraging or prohibiting abstention, strategic behavior, and/or coordination may reduce efficiency. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Blockholder
Shareholder voting
Corporate governance
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11933
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540745
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Heski Bar-Isaac,Joel Shapiro. DP11933 Blockholder Voting. 2017.
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