| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11939 |
| DP11939 Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion | |
| Marco Ottaviani | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-25 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An informer sequentially collects information at a cost to influence an evaluator's choice between rejection and approval. Payoffs and control rights are split between informer and evaluator depending on the organizational rules governing the approval process. We compare the performance of different organizations from a positive and normative perspective, depending on the commitment power of informer and evaluator. As a welfare benchmark we recover Wald's (1947) classic solution for a statistician with payoff equal to the sum of our informer and evaluator. We apply the analysis to the regulatory process for drug approval and to the market for new technologies. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Persuasion Information Organization Opproval |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11939 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540751 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Ottaviani. DP11939 Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion. 2017. |
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