| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11947 |
| DP11947 Deposit Insurance and Reinsurance: A General Equilibrium Perspective | |
| Hans Gersbach; Volker Britz; Hans Haller | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-29 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the consequences and optimal design of bank deposit insurance and reinsurance in a general equilibrium setting. The model involves two production sectors. One sector is financed by issuing bonds to risk–averse households. Firms in the other sector are monitored and financed by banks. Households fund banks through deposits and equity. Deposits are explicitly insured by a deposit insurance fund. Any remaining shortfall is implicitly guaranteed by the government. The deposit insurance fund charges banks a premium per unit of deposits whereas the government finances any necessary bail-outs by lump-sum taxation of households. When the deposit insurance premium is actuarially fair or higher than actuarially fair, two types of equilibria emerge: One type of equilibria supports the Pareto optimal allocation, and the other type does not. In the latter case, bank lending is too large relative to equity and the probability that the banking system collapses is positive. Next, we show that a judicious combination of deposit insurance and reinsurance eliminates all non–optimal equilibrium allocations. Our paper provides a benchmark result for policy proposals that advocate deposit insurance cum reinsurance. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Financial intermediation Deposit insurance Capital structure General equilibrium Reinsurance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11947 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540759 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Volker Britz,Hans Haller. DP11947 Deposit Insurance and Reinsurance: A General Equilibrium Perspective. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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