| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11956 |
| DP11956 Pipeline Risk in Leveraged Loan Syndication | |
| Frederic Malherbe; Max Bruche; Ralf R Meisenzahl | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-04-10 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Leveraged term loans are typically arranged by banks but distributed to institutional investors. Using novel data, we find that to elicit investors' willingness to pay, arrangers expose themselves to pipeline risk : They have to retain larger shares when investors are willing to pay less than expected. We argue that the retention of such problematic loans creates a debt overhang problem. Consistent with this, we find that the materialization of pipeline risk for an arranger reduces its subsequent arranging and lending activity. Aggregate time series exhibit a similar pattern, which suggests that the informational friction we identify could amplify the credit cycle. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Syndicated loans Leveraged loans Pipeline risk Lead arranger share Debt overhang |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11956 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540768 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Frederic Malherbe,Max Bruche,Ralf R Meisenzahl. DP11956 Pipeline Risk in Leveraged Loan Syndication. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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