| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11964 |
| DP11964 The Political Economy of Program Enforcement: Evidence from Brazil | |
| Eliana La Ferrara; Fernanda Brollo | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-04-18 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Do politicians manipulate the enforcement of conditional welfare programs to influence electoral outcomes? We study the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) in Brazil, which provides a monthly stipend to poor families conditional on school attendance. Repeated failure to comply with this requirement results in increasing penalties. First, we exploit random variation in the timing when beneficiaries learn about penalties for noncompliance around the 2008 municipal elections. We find that the vote share of candidates aligned with the President is lower in zip codes where more beneficiaries received penalties shortly before (as opposed to shortly after) the elections. Second, we show that politicians strategically manipulate enforcement. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find weaker enforcement before elections in municipalities where mayors from the presidential coalition can run for reelection. Finally, we provide evidence that manipulation occurs through misreporting school attendance, particularly in municipalities with a higher fraction of students in schools with politically connected principals. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11964 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540775 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eliana La Ferrara,Fernanda Brollo. DP11964 The Political Economy of Program Enforcement: Evidence from Brazil. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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