G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11965
DP11965 Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil
Eliana La Ferrara; Fernanda Brollo
发表日期2017-04-18
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We study the implementation of Bolsa Familia, a program that conditions cash transfers to poor families on children's school attendance. Using unique administrative data, we analyze how beneficiaries respond to the enforcement of conditionality. Making use of random variation in the day on which punishments are received, we find that school attendance increases after families are punished for past noncompliance. Families also respond to penalties experienced by peers: a child's attendance increases if her own classmates, but also her siblings' classmates (in other grades or schools), experience enforcement. As the severity of penalties increases with repeated noncompliance, households' response is larger when peers receive a penalty that the family has not (yet) received. We thus find evidence of spillover effects and learning about enforcement.
主题Development Economics ; Public Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11965
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540776
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Eliana La Ferrara,Fernanda Brollo. DP11965 Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil. 2017.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Eliana La Ferrara]的文章
[Fernanda Brollo]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Eliana La Ferrara]的文章
[Fernanda Brollo]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Eliana La Ferrara]的文章
[Fernanda Brollo]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。