Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP11965 |
DP11965 Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil | |
Eliana La Ferrara; Fernanda Brollo | |
发表日期 | 2017-04-18 |
出版年 | 2017 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study the implementation of Bolsa Familia, a program that conditions cash transfers to poor families on children's school attendance. Using unique administrative data, we analyze how beneficiaries respond to the enforcement of conditionality. Making use of random variation in the day on which punishments are received, we find that school attendance increases after families are punished for past noncompliance. Families also respond to penalties experienced by peers: a child's attendance increases if her own classmates, but also her siblings' classmates (in other grades or schools), experience enforcement. As the severity of penalties increases with repeated noncompliance, households' response is larger when peers receive a penalty that the family has not (yet) received. We thus find evidence of spillover effects and learning about enforcement. |
主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11965 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540776 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eliana La Ferrara,Fernanda Brollo. DP11965 Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil. 2017. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。