| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11974 |
| DP11974 Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic? | |
| Karin S. Thorburn; B Espen Eckbo | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-04-19 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The more the target knows about the bidder, the more difficult it is to pay with overpriced shares. Thus, under bidder opportunism, the fraction of stock in the deal payment is lower with better-informed targets. We test this simple prediction using information proxies reflecting industry relatedness and geographic location specific to the merging firms. We find instead that public bidders systematically use more stock in the payment when the target knows more about the bidder. While inconsistent with opportunism, this is as predicted when bidders are primarily concerned with adverse selection on the target side of the deal. Moreover, tests based on exogenous variation in bidder market-to-book ratios, identified using aggregate mutual fund outflows, also fail to support bidder opportunism. Finally, “cash-only” targets and potential competition from private bidders appear to place significant external pressure on public bidders to pay in cash. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Takeover bidding Payment method Mispricing Cash payment Stock payment Information asymmetry Opportunism Governance Mutual fund flow |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11974 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540785 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Karin S. Thorburn,B Espen Eckbo. DP11974 Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic?. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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