G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11974
DP11974 Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic?
Karin S. Thorburn; B Espen Eckbo
发表日期2017-04-19
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要The more the target knows about the bidder, the more difficult it is to pay with overpriced shares. Thus, under bidder opportunism, the fraction of stock in the deal payment is lower with better-informed targets. We test this simple prediction using information proxies reflecting industry relatedness and geographic location specific to the merging firms. We find instead that public bidders systematically use more stock in the payment when the target knows more about the bidder. While inconsistent with opportunism, this is as predicted when bidders are primarily concerned with adverse selection on the target side of the deal. Moreover, tests based on exogenous variation in bidder market-to-book ratios, identified using aggregate mutual fund outflows, also fail to support bidder opportunism. Finally, “cash-only” targets and potential competition from private bidders appear to place significant external pressure on public bidders to pay in cash.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Takeover bidding Payment method Mispricing Cash payment Stock payment Information asymmetry Opportunism Governance Mutual fund flow
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11974
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540785
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Karin S. Thorburn,B Espen Eckbo. DP11974 Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic?. 2017.
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