| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12008 |
| DP12008 How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation | |
| Leonardo Gambacorta; Vittoria Cerasi; Sebastian M. Deininger; Tommaso Oliviero | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper assesses whether compensation practices for bank Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) changed after the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued post-crisis guidelines on sound compensation. Banks in jurisdictions which implemented the FSB’s Principles and Standards of Sound Compensation in national legislation changed their compensation policies more than other banks. Compensation in those jurisdictions is less linked to short-term profits and more linked to risks, with CEOs at riskier banks receiving less, by way of variable compensation, than those at less-risky peers. This was particularly true of investment banks and of banks which previously had weaker risk management, for example those that previously lacked a Chief Risk Officer. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Managerial compensation Prudential regulation Risk-taking |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12008 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540820 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leonardo Gambacorta,Vittoria Cerasi,Sebastian M. Deininger,et al. DP12008 How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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