| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12010 |
| DP12010 Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid For Investment Skill? | |
| Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh; Roine Vestman; Ron Kaniel; Markus Ibert | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based data set on the compensation of Swedish mutual fund managers. We find a concave relationship between pay and revenue, in contrast to how investors compensate the fund company (firm). We also find a surprisingly weak sensitivity of pay to performance, even after accounting for the indirect effects of performance on revenue. Firm-level revenues and profits add substantial explanatory power for compensation to manager-level revenue and performance, highlighting the importance of the mutual fund firm. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Portfolio manager compensation Mutual fund performance Financial sector income |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12010 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540822 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh,Roine Vestman,Ron Kaniel,et al. DP12010 Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid For Investment Skill?. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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