| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12012 |
| DP12012 Decentralization and Efficiency of Subsidy Targeting: Evidence from Chiefs in Rural Malawi | |
| Pascaline Dupas; Jonathan Robinson | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Developing countries spend vast sums on subsidies. Beneficiaries are typically selected via either a proxy-means test (PMT) or through a decentralized identification process led by local leaders. A decentralized allocation may offer informational advantages, but may be prone to elite capture. We study this tradeoff in the context of two large-scale subsidy programs in Malawi (for agricultural inputs and food) decentralized to traditional leaders (“chiefs”) who are asked to target the needy. Using high-frequency household panel data on neediness and shocks, we find that nepotism exists but has only limited mistargeting consequences. Importantly, we find that chiefs target households with higher returns to farm inputs, generating an allocation that is more productively efficient than what could be achieved through a PMT. This could be welfare improving, since within-village redistribution is common. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12012 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540824 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pascaline Dupas,Jonathan Robinson. DP12012 Decentralization and Efficiency of Subsidy Targeting: Evidence from Chiefs in Rural Malawi. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
