| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12023 |
| DP12023 Marginal Deterrence at Work | |
| Rosario Crinò; Salvatore Piccolo; Giovanni Immordino | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-05-05 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We test the rational economic model of marginal deterrence of law enforcement --- i.e., the need for graduating the penalty to the severity of the crime. We use a unique data set, which combines individual-level data on sentence length for a representative sample of US inmates with proxies for maximum punishment and monitoring costs across US states over 50 years. We show that the penalty is increasing in the level of the offense. Consistent with the marginal deterrence framework, we also document that a decrease in maximum penalty or an increase in monitoring cost are associated with longer sentences and higher monitoring rates. We also provide evidence that the effects of maximum penalty and monitoring cost are stronger in states where income inequality is higher. Finally, we show that steeper sanctions are associated with less harmful crimes. Overall, these findings favor the marginal deterrence framework over the maximal penalty principle and other competing theories of justice. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Marginal deterrence Enforcement policies Individual-level data Death penalty |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12023 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540835 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rosario Crinò,Salvatore Piccolo,Giovanni Immordino. DP12023 Marginal Deterrence at Work. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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