| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12033 |
| DP12033 Corporate Leverage and Employees’ Rights in Bankruptcy | |
| Andrew Ellul; Marco Pagano | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-05-09 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Corporate leverage responds differently to employees’ rights in bankruptcy depending on whether it is driven by strategic concerns in wage bargaining or by credit constraints. Using novel data on employees’ rights in bankruptcy, we estimate their impact on leverage, exploiting time-series, cross-country and firm-level variation in the data. For financially unconstrained firms, results accord with the strategic debt model: leverage increases more in response to rises in corporate property values or profitability if employees have strong seniority in liquidation and weak rights in restructuring. Instead, in financially constrained firms leverage responds less to these shocks if employees have stronger seniority. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Workers’ rights Bankruptcy Seniority Leverage Wage bargaining |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12033-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540845 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Ellul,Marco Pagano. DP12033 Corporate Leverage and Employees’ Rights in Bankruptcy. 2017. |
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