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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP12034 |
DP12034 Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Two Products | |
John Thanassoulis; Jean Charles Rochet | |
发表日期 | 2017-05-09 |
出版年 | 2017 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study the two-product monopoly profit maximisation problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly-ordered then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination: the seller offers a choice between supplying a complete bundle now, or delaying the supply of a component of that bundle until a later date. For general valuations we establish a sufficient condition for such dynamic pricing to be more profitable than mixed bundling. So we show that the Stokey (1979) no-discrimination-across-time result does not extend to two-product sellers when consumers' valuations are drawn from many standard distributions. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Multidimensional mechanism design Cross-sell Second degree price discrimination Bundling Time discounting Substitutes and complements |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12034-1 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540846 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Thanassoulis,Jean Charles Rochet. DP12034 Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Two Products. 2017. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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