全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP12045 Imperfect Financial Markets and Shareholder Incentives in Partial and General Equilibrium

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP12045
	DP12045 Imperfect Financial Markets and Shareholder Incentives in Partial and General Equilibrium
	Christian HELLWIG; Elias Albagli; Aleh Tsyvinski
发表日期	2017-05-12
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	We analyze the firm-level and aggregate consequences of equity market imperfections in the form of noisy information aggregation for corporate risk-taking and investment. Market imperfections cause controlling shareholders to invest too much in upside risks and too little in downside risks in an attempt to capture market rents. In partial equilibrium, these inefficiencies are particularly severe if upside risks are coupled with near constant returns to scale. In general equilibrium, the shareholders' collective attempts to boost shareholder value of individual firms leads to a novel pecuniary externality that amplifies investment distortions with downside risks but offsets distortions with upside risks, thereby overturning the results from the partial equilibrium analysis. We consider policy interventions to correct the distortions, and show that in general equilibrium such interventions disrupt the financial market's allocational role. We analyze extensions of our model to excess leverage, agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, negative welfare effects of transparency, excess sensitivity of investment to stock prices, and dynamically inconsistent firm behavior.
主题	Financial Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp12045
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540857
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Christian HELLWIG,Elias Albagli,Aleh Tsyvinski. DP12045 Imperfect Financial Markets and Shareholder Incentives in Partial and General Equilibrium. 2017.