G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12049
DP12049 Selling with Evidence
Vasiliki Skreta; Frédéric Koessler
发表日期2017-05-17
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We study how to optimally sell a good in a bilateral asymmetric information monopoly setting with interdependent values when the informed seller can voluntarily and costlessly provide evidence about the good's characteristics. Equilibrium allocations are feasible and immune to deviations to any mechanism. We show that there is an ex-ante profit-maximizing selling procedure that is an equilibrium of the mechanism-proposal game. In contrast to posted price settings, information unravelling of product characteristics may fail even when all buyer types agree on the ranking of product quality.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Informed principal Consumer heterogeneity Interdependent valuations Product information disclosure Mechanism design Certification
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12049
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540860
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Vasiliki Skreta,Frédéric Koessler. DP12049 Selling with Evidence. 2017.
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