| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12049 |
| DP12049 Selling with Evidence | |
| Vasiliki Skreta; Frédéric Koessler | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-05-17 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how to optimally sell a good in a bilateral asymmetric information monopoly setting with interdependent values when the informed seller can voluntarily and costlessly provide evidence about the good's characteristics. Equilibrium allocations are feasible and immune to deviations to any mechanism. We show that there is an ex-ante profit-maximizing selling procedure that is an equilibrium of the mechanism-proposal game. In contrast to posted price settings, information unravelling of product characteristics may fail even when all buyer types agree on the ranking of product quality. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Informed principal Consumer heterogeneity Interdependent valuations Product information disclosure Mechanism design Certification |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12049 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540860 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vasiliki Skreta,Frédéric Koessler. DP12049 Selling with Evidence. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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