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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP12097 |
DP12097 The Political Cost of Being Soft on Crime: Evidence from a Natural Experiment | |
Francesco Drago; roberto galbiati; Francesco Sobbrio | |
发表日期 | 2017-06-15 |
出版年 | 2017 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We provide evidence about voters' response to crime control policies. We exploit a natural experiment arising from the Italian 2006 collective pardon releasing about one third of the prison population. The pardon created idiosyncratic incentives to recidivate across released individuals and municipalities. We show that municipalities where resident pardoned individuals have a higher incentive to recidivate experienced higher recidivism. Moreover, in these municipalities: i) newspapers were more likely to report crime news involving pardoned individuals; ii) voters held worse beliefs on the incumbent governments ability to control crime and iii) with respect to the previous elections, the incumbent national government experienced a worse electoral performance in the April 2008 national elections relative to the opposition coalition. Overall, our findings indicate that voters keep incumbent politicians accountable by conditioning their vote on the observed effects of their policies. |
主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
关键词 | Accountability Voting Natural experiment Crime Recidivism |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12097 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540909 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Drago,roberto galbiati,Francesco Sobbrio. DP12097 The Political Cost of Being Soft on Crime: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. 2017. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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