| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12104 |
| DP12104 Equity versus Bail-in Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective | |
| Javier Suarez; Caterina Mendicino; Kalin Nikolov | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-06-19 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the optimal size and composition of banks' total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC). Optimal size is driven by the trade-off between providing liquidity services through deposits and minimizing deadweight default costs. Optimal composition (equity vs. bail-in debt) is driven by the relative importance of two incentive problems: risk shifting (mitigated by equity) and private benefit taking (mitigated by debt). Our quantitative results suggest that TLAC size in line with current regulation is appropriate. However, an important fraction of it should consist of bail-in debt because such buffer size makes the costs of risk-shifting relatively less important at the margin. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bail-in debt Loss absorbing capacity Risk shifting Agency problems Bank regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12104 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540916 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Javier Suarez,Caterina Mendicino,Kalin Nikolov. DP12104 Equity versus Bail-in Debt in Banking: An Agency Perspective. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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