| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12113 |
| DP12113 Strategic Entry and Potential Competition: Evidence from Compressed Gas Fuel Retail | |
| Andrea Pozzi; Gabriele Rovigatti | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-06-26 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide novel evidence on the effect of the threat of potential competition on the timing of entry in a new and growing industry. Exploiting a change in regulation in the Italian retail fuel market that generates exogenous variation in the number of potential entrants in the emerging Compressed Natural Gas segment, we show that markets with a higher number of potential entrants witness speedier entry decisions by firms managers. We document that this result is likely driven by an increase in the incentives to preempt the market due to heightened risk of being anticipated by competitors. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Preemption Potential entrants Retail fuel market |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12113-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540925 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrea Pozzi,Gabriele Rovigatti. DP12113 Strategic Entry and Potential Competition: Evidence from Compressed Gas Fuel Retail. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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