| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12122 |
| DP12122 Populism and Central Bank Independence | |
| Charles A. E. Goodhart; Rosa Lastra | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The consensus that surrounded the granting of central bank independence in the pursuit of a price stability oriented monetary policy has been challenged in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, in the light of the rise of populism on the one hand and the expanded mandates of central banks on the other hand. After considering the economic case for independence and the three Ds (distributional, directional and duration effects), the paper examines three different dimensions in the debate of how the rise in populism - or simply general discontent with the status quo - affects central bank independence. Finally, the paper examines how to interpret the legality of central bank mandates, and whether or not central banks have exceeded their powers. This analysis leads us in turn to consider accountability and, in particular, the judicial review of central bank actions and decisions. It is important to have in place adequate mechanisms to ‘guard the guardians’ of monetary and financial stability. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Central bank independence Populism Mandates Accountability Legitimacy Judicial review |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12122 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540933 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles A. E. Goodhart,Rosa Lastra. DP12122 Populism and Central Bank Independence. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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