G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12125
DP12125 Hunting Unicorns? Experimental Evidence on Predatory Pricing Policies
Armin Schmutzler; Catherine Roux; Christian Thoeni
发表日期2017-07-01
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We study the anti-competitive effects of predatory pricing and the efficacy of three policy responses. In a series of experiments where an incumbent and a potential entrant interact, we compare prices, market structures and welfare. Under a laissez-faire regime, the threat of post-entry price cuts discourages entry, and allows incumbents to charge monopoly prices. Current U.S. policy (Brooke Group) does not help. A policy suggested by Baumol (1979) lowers post-exit prices, while Edlin’s (2002) proposal reduces pre-entry prices and encourages entry. While both policies show outcomes after entry that are less competitive than under Laissez-Faire, they nevertheless increase consumer welfare.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Predatory pricing Entry deterrence Firm strategy Antitrust law Experiment
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12125
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540936
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Armin Schmutzler,Catherine Roux,Christian Thoeni. DP12125 Hunting Unicorns? Experimental Evidence on Predatory Pricing Policies. 2017.
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