| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12128 |
| DP12128 Spillovers, Persistence and Learning: Institutions and the Dynamics of Cooperation | |
| roberto galbiati; Nicolas Jacquemet | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-07-04 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how cooperation-enforcing institutions dynamically affect values and behavior using a lab experiment designed to create individual specific histories of past institutional exposure. We show that the effect of past institutions is mostly due to "indirect" behavioral spillovers: facing penalties in the past increases partners' cooperation in the past, which in turn positively affects ones' own current behavior. We demonstrate that such indirect spillovers induce persistent effects of institutions. However, for interactions that occur early on, we find a negative effect of past enforcement due to differential learning under different enforcement institutions. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Laws Social values Cooperation Learning Spillovers Persistence of institutions Repeated games Experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12128 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540939 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | roberto galbiati,Nicolas Jacquemet. DP12128 Spillovers, Persistence and Learning: Institutions and the Dynamics of Cooperation. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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