| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12151 |
| DP12151 Capital Structure Under Collusion | |
| Gaizka Ormazabal; Daniel Ferrés | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-07-17 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the financial leverage of firms that collude by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage ratios during collusion periods, consistent with the idea that reductions in leverage help increase cartel stability. Cartel firms have a surprisingly large economic footprint (they represent more than 20% of the total market capitalization in the U.S.), so understanding their decisions is relevant. Our findings show that anti-competitive behavior has a significant effect on capital structure choices. They also shed new light on the relation between profitability and financial leverage. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Capital structure Financial leverage Financial policies Collusion Cartels Trigger strategies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12151 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540962 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gaizka Ormazabal,Daniel Ferrés. DP12151 Capital Structure Under Collusion. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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