| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12158 |
| DP12158 Towards a Political Theory of the Firm | |
| Luigi Zingales | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-07-18 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Neoclassical theory assumes that firms have no power of fiat any different from ordinary market contracting, thus a fortiori no power to influence the rules of the game. In the real world, firms have such power. I argue that the more firms have market power, the more they have both the ability and the need to gain political power. Thus, market concentration can easily lead to a “Medici vicious circle, where money is used to get political power and political power is used to make money. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Theory of the firm Lobbying Concentration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12158 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540970 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luigi Zingales. DP12158 Towards a Political Theory of the Firm. 2017. |
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