| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12174 |
| DP12174 Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-07-22 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach to the theory of the firm, it is usually assumed that information is symmetric. Ownership matters for investment incentives, provided that investments are partly relationship-specific. We study the case of completely relationship-specific investments (i.e., the disagreement payoffs do not depend on the investments). It turns out that if there is asymmetric information, then ownership matters for investment incentives and for the expected total surplus. Specifically, giving ownership to party B can be optimal, even when only party A has to make an investment decision and even when the owner's expected disagreement payoff is larger under A-ownership. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Property rights Relationship specificity Investment incentives Private information Incomplete contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12174 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540986 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP12174 Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. 2017. |
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