| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP12175
|
| DP12175 Migration-Induced Redistribution with and without migrant voting |
| Assaf Razin; Efraim Sadka
|
| 发表日期 | 2017-08-03
|
| 出版年 | 2017
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We are motivated by the unique migration experience of Israel of a supply-side shock triggering skilled immigration and the concurrent decline in welfare-state redistribution. This paper develops a model, which can provide an explanation for the mechanism through which a supply-side shock triggering high-skill migration can also reshape the political-economy balance and the redistributive policies. The paper highlights the differences in the political-economy induced redistribution policies between the cases in which migrants participate in the electoral system and the case where they do not. When migrants are allowed to vote, and they take advantage of this right, then, following the shock, all income groups gain, except low skilled income groups who lose. When migrants are not allowed to vote, or choose not to participate in elections, all income groups gain, except the skilled migrants who lose. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance
|
| 关键词 | Welfare state
High skill migration
Voting turnout
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12175
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541007
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Assaf Razin,Efraim Sadka. DP12175 Migration-Induced Redistribution with and without migrant voting. 2017.
|
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