| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12202 |
| DP12202 Strategic Sample Selection | |
| Alfredo Di Tillio; Marco Ottaviani; Peter Norman Sørensen | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-08-05 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a notion of multivariate accuracy to characterize the welfare impact of sample selection from a larger presample. Maximal selection benefits or hurts a decision maker with interval dominance ordered preferences if the reverse hazard rate of the data distribution is log-supermodular—as in location experiments with normal noise—or log-submodular. Applying the result to auctions, we show that under non-pathological conditions the information contained in the winning bids decreases as the number of bidders increases. Exploiting a connection to extreme value theory, we quantify the limit amount of information when the presample size goes to infinity, as under perfect competition. In the context of a model of equilibrium persuasion with costly information, we also derive implications for the design of selected experiments when selection is made by an examinee, a biased researcher, or contending sides with the peremptory challenge right to eliminate a number of jurors. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Strategic selection Persuasion Comparison of experiments Dispersion Welfare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12202-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541014 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alfredo Di Tillio,Marco Ottaviani,Peter Norman Sørensen. DP12202 Strategic Sample Selection. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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