| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12206 |
| DP12206 Fundamental Errors in the Voting Booth | |
| Giacomo Ponzetto; Edward Glaeser | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-08-07 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Psychologists have long documented that we over-attribute people's actions to innate characteristics, rather than to luck or circumstances. Similarly, economists have found that both politicians and businessmen are rewarded for luck. In this paper, we introduce this "Fundamental Attribution Error" into two benchmark political economy models. In both models, voter irrationality can improve politicians' behavior, because voters attribute good behavior to fixed attributes that merit reelection. This upside of irrationality is countered by suboptimal leader selection, including electing leaders who emphasize objectives that are beyond their control. The error has particularly adverse consequences for institutional choice, where it generates too little demand for a free press, too much demand for dictatorship, and responding to endemic corruption by electing new supposedly honest leaders, instead of investing in institutional reform. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Fundamental attribution error Political economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12206 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541018 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giacomo Ponzetto,Edward Glaeser. DP12206 Fundamental Errors in the Voting Booth. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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