| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12207 |
| DP12207 The Political Economy of Transportation Investment | |
| Giacomo Ponzetto; Edward Glaeser | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-08-07 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Will politics lead to over-building or under-building of transportation projects? In this paper, we develop a model of infrastructure policy in which politicians overdo things that have hidden costs and underperform tasks whose costs voters readily perceive. Consequently, national funding of transportation leads to overspending, since voters more readily perceive the upside of new projects than the future taxes that will be paid for distant highways. Yet when local voters are well-informed, the highly salient nuisances of local construction, including land taking and noise, lead to under-building. This framework explains the decline of urban mega-projects in the US (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003) as the result of increasingly educated and organized urban voters. Our framework also predicts more per capita transportation spending in low-density and less educated areas, which seems to be empirically correct. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Infrastructure Political economy Transportation investment Nuisance mitigation Elections Imperfect information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12207 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541019 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giacomo Ponzetto,Edward Glaeser. DP12207 The Political Economy of Transportation Investment. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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