| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12232 |
| DP12232 Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence from Tenancy Contracts | |
| Konrad Burchardi; Selim Gulesci; Benedetta Lerva; Munshi Sulaiman | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-08-21 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries. Output sharing rules that make farmers less-than-full residual claimants of their produce are seen as one of the main drivers of low agricultural productivity. We report results from a field experiment designed to estimate and understand the effects of sharecropping contracts on agricultural input choices, risk-taking, and output. The experiment induced variation in the terms of sharecropping contracts. After agreeing to pay 50% of their output to the landlord, tenants were randomized into three groups: (i) some kept 50% of their output; (ii) others kept 75%; (iii) others kept 50% of output and received a lump sum payment at the end of their contract, either fixed or stochastic. We find that tenants with higher output shares utilized more inputs, cultivated riskier crops, and produced 60% more output relative to control. Income or risk exposure have at most a small effect on farm output; the increase in output should be interpreted as an incentive effect of the output sharing rule. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Agricultural productivity Contracts Incentive effects Sharecropping |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12232 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541043 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konrad Burchardi,Selim Gulesci,Benedetta Lerva,et al. DP12232 Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence from Tenancy Contracts. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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