G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12235
DP12235 P2P Lending: Information Externalities, Social Networks and Loans Substitution
Ester Faia; Michaela Pagel
发表日期2017-08-23
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要Despite the lack of delegated monitor and of collateral guarantees P2P lending platforms exhibit relatively low loan and delinquency rates. The adverse selection is indeed mitigated by a new screening technology (information processing through machine learning) that provides costless public signals. Using data from Prosper and Lending Club we show that loans' spreads, proxing asymmetric information, decline with credit scores or hard information indicators and with indications from "group ties" (soft information from social networks). Also an increase in the risk of bank run in the traditional banking sector increases participation in the P2P markets and reduces their rates (substitution effect). We rationalize this evidence with a dynamic general equilibrium model where lenders and borrowers choose between traditional bank services (subject to the risk of bank runs and early liquidation) and P2P markets (which clear at a pooling price due to asymmetric information, but where public signals facilitate screening).
主题Financial Economics
关键词Peer-to-peer lending Pooling equilibria Signals Value of information Liquidity shocks
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12235
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541046
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ester Faia,Michaela Pagel. DP12235 P2P Lending: Information Externalities, Social Networks and Loans Substitution. 2017.
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