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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP12240 |
DP12240 Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction | |
Dirk Bergemann; Juuso Välimäki | |
发表日期 | 2017-08-25 |
出版年 | 2017 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We provide an introduction into the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves and D'Aspremont-Gérard-Varet mechanisms to a dynamic environment. Second, we discuss results on revenue optimal mechanism. We cover models of sequential screening and revenue maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agent's types. Third, we consider models with changing populations of agents over time. This allows us to address new issues relating to the properties of payment rules. After discussing related models with risk-averse agents, limited liability, and different performance criteria for the mechanisms, we conclude by discussing a number of open questions and challenges that remain for the theory of dynamic mechanism design. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Dynamic mechanism design Sequential screening Dynamic pivot mechanism Bandit auctions Information management |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12240 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541051 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Bergemann,Juuso Välimäki. DP12240 Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. 2017. |
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