G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12240
DP12240 Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction
Dirk Bergemann; Juuso Välimäki
发表日期2017-08-25
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We provide an introduction into the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves and D'Aspremont-Gérard-Varet mechanisms to a dynamic environment. Second, we discuss results on revenue optimal mechanism. We cover models of sequential screening and revenue maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agent's types. Third, we consider models with changing populations of agents over time. This allows us to address new issues relating to the properties of payment rules. After discussing related models with risk-averse agents, limited liability, and different performance criteria for the mechanisms, we conclude by discussing a number of open questions and challenges that remain for the theory of dynamic mechanism design.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Dynamic mechanism design Sequential screening Dynamic pivot mechanism Bandit auctions Information management
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12240
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541051
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dirk Bergemann,Juuso Välimäki. DP12240 Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction. 2017.
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