G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12242
DP12242 Cognitive Bias in Insurance: Evidence from India
Jean-Philippe Platteau
发表日期2017-08-25
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要This paper is an attempt to understand the factors behind low contract renewal rates frequently observed in insurance programs in poor countries. This is done on the basis of the experience of a micro-insurance health program in India. We show that poor understanding of the insurance concept, compounded by a serious supply-side information failure, is a major cause of low contract renewal among households which had previously enrolled into the program. Controlling for the level of their information about how to collect the insurance payout, households that did not experience a health shock during the first year tended to pull out of the scheme when they are subject to a cognitive bias reflected in short-term framing. When they are classic expected utility maximizers, however, the absence of a health shock did not affect their contract renewal decision. The policy implication of our findings is considerable since they provide a strong justification for mandatory universal health insurance.
主题Development Economics
关键词Insurance Myopic behavior Cognitive ability Health economics Information failure Non-governmental organizations
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12242
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541053
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jean-Philippe Platteau. DP12242 Cognitive Bias in Insurance: Evidence from India. 2017.
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