| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP12258
|
| DP12258 Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives |
| Patrick W. Schmitz
|
| 发表日期 | 2017-08-31
|
| 出版年 | 2017
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of an asset. It is ex post efficient that tomorrow the party with the larger valuation gets the asset. Yet, today the parties can make investments to enhance the asset's productivity. Contracts are incomplete, so today only the ownership structure can be specified, which may be renegotiated tomorrow. It turns out that shared ownership is often optimal. If the investments are embodied in the physical asset, it may be optimal that party B has a larger ownership share even when party A has a larger valuation and a better investment technology. When shared ownership is taken into account, joint ownership in the sense of bilateral veto power cannot be optimal, regardless of whether the investments are in human capital or in physical capital. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Property rights
Incomplete contracts
Investment incentives
Partnership dissolution
Shared ownership
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12258
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541069
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Patrick W. Schmitz. DP12258 Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives. 2017.
|
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