| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12260 |
| DP12260 Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Paolo Buccirossi; Giovanni Immordino | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-08-31 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is often claimed that rewards for whistleblowers lead to fraudulent reports, but for several US programs this has not been a major problem. We model the interaction between rewards for whistleblowers, sanctions against fraudulent reporting, judicial errors and standards of proof in the court case on a whistleblowers allegations and the possible follow-up for fraudulent allegations. Balancing whistleblower rewards, sanctions against fraudulent reports, and courts standards of proof is essential for these policies to succeed. When the risk of retaliation is severe, larger rewards are needed and so are tougher sanctions against fraudulent reports. The precision of the legal system must be sufficiently high, hence these programs are not viable in weak institution environments, where protection is imperfect and court precision low, or where sanctions against false reporting are mild. Internal reporting channels may interfere with external ones in unexpected ways. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Whistleblowers rewards False allegations Judicial errors Standard of proof Corporate fraud |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12260 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541071 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Paolo Buccirossi,Giovanni Immordino. DP12260 Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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