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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP12280 |
DP12280 Sequential Banking: Direct and Externality Effects on Delinquency | |
Giacomo DE GIORGI; Andres Drenik; Enrique Seira Bejarano | |
发表日期 | 2017-09-07 |
出版年 | 2017 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The ability to borrow sequentially from multiple lenders is a standard feature of credit markets that may lead to high default and inefficiency, yet little is known about its prevalence in practice and the magnitude of risks it induces. We show that sequential banking is pervasive, that it causes a 92% increase in default on sequentially prior cards and 48% for non-card loans, resulting in average losses of 18% of total debt, an important externality on previous lenders. The effect of more credit on default is only present for borrowers at the “bancarization” margin, not for ex-ante low risk applicants. |
主题 | Development Economics ; Financial Economics |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12280-0 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541091 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giacomo DE GIORGI,Andres Drenik,Enrique Seira Bejarano. DP12280 Sequential Banking: Direct and Externality Effects on Delinquency. 2017. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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