G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP12285
DP12285 Impact of Managerial Commitment on Risk Taking with Dynamic Fund Flows
Ron Kaniel
发表日期2017-09-08
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We present a model with dynamic investment flows, where fund managers have the ability to generate excess returns and study how forcing them to commit part or all of their personal wealth to the fund they manage affects fund risk taking. We contrast the behavior of a manager that may invest her personal wealth in a private account to a manager that is either forced to commit her wealth to the fund she manages, or a manager who is not allowed to hold risky assets held by the fund privately. We show that a fund managed by a manager with higher ability does not necessarily achieve higher expected returns but achieves lower idiosyncratic volatility. For a manager with constant ability, restrictions placed on her personal account do not influence her choices in the fund, while for a manager whose ability varies stochastically they result in higher expected returns and idiosyncratic volatilities. Fund strategies can be non-monotone both in the manager’s commitment level and the ratio of manager to investor wealth. Our results are robust to incomplete information and to competing managers with correlated ability.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Mutual fund Portfolio Flows Commitment
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp12285
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541096
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ron Kaniel. DP12285 Impact of Managerial Commitment on Risk Taking with Dynamic Fund Flows. 2017.
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