| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12297 |
| DP12297 Attention Manipulation and Information Overload | |
| Petra Persson | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-09-12 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Limits on consumer attention give firms incentives to manipulate prospective buyers’ allocation of attention. This paper models such attention manipulation and shows that it limits the ability of disclosure regulation to improve consumer welfare. Competitive information supply, from firms competing for attention, can reduce consumers’ knowledge by causing information overload. A single firm subjected to a disclosure mandate may deliberately induce such information overload to obfuscate financially relevant information, or engage in product complexification to bound consumers’ financial literacy. Thus, disclosure rules that would improve welfare for agents without attention limitations can prove ineffective for consumers with limited attention. Obfuscation suggests a role for rules that mandate not only the content but also the format of disclosure; however, even rules that mandate “easy-to-understand” formats can be ineffective against complexification, which may call for regulation of product design. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Information overload Complexity Persuasion Disclosure regulation Consumer protection Salience |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12297 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541108 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Petra Persson. DP12297 Attention Manipulation and Information Overload. 2017. |
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