全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP12305 The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP12305
	DP12305 The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives
	Alex Edmans; Vivian Fang; Allen Huang
发表日期	2017-09-17
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	This paper shows that short-term stock price concerns induce CEOs to take value-reducing actions. Vesting equity, our measure of short-term concerns, is positively associated with the probability of a firm repurchasing shares, the amount of shares repurchased, and the probability of the firm announcing a merger and acquisition (M&A). When vesting equity increases, stock returns are more positive in the two quarters surrounding both repurchases and M&A, but more negative in the two years following repurchases and four years following M&A. These results are inconsistent with CEOs buying underpriced stocks or companies to maximize long-run shareholder value, but consistent with these actions being used to boost the short-term stock price and improve the conditions for equity sales. Overall, by identifying actions that carry clear value implications, this paper documents the long-term negative consequences of short-term incentives.
主题	Financial Economics
关键词	Repurchases Ceo incentives Managerial myopia Vesting M&a Short-termism
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp12305
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541115
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Alex Edmans,Vivian Fang,Allen Huang. DP12305 The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives. 2017.