| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12308 |
| DP12308 Connections and Applicants' Self-Selection: Evidence from a Natural Randomized Experiment | |
| Manuel Bagues; Natalia Zinovyeva; Mauro Sylos Labini | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-09-18 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Prospective candidates with connections in committees may have access to more accurate information about evaluation standards. When applications are costly, this informational advantage may reduce the application rate of connected individuals, leading to a positive selection among applicants. We document the relevance of this phenomenon using data from national evaluations in Italian academia. Researchers are significantly less likely to apply when the committee includes, through the luck of the draw, a colleague or a coauthor. At the same time, they tend to receive more favorable evaluations from their connections. Our analysis indicates that self-selection may bias in a non-trivial way estimates of evaluation biases that rely on observational data. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Connections Self-selection Academic labor markets |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12308 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541118 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Manuel Bagues,Natalia Zinovyeva,Mauro Sylos Labini. DP12308 Connections and Applicants' Self-Selection: Evidence from a Natural Randomized Experiment. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
