| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12353 |
| DP12353 Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information | |
| [unavailable] | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-04 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a possible round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk before the game is played. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that the players are overall truthful about their types in the cheap-talk phase in both one-way or two-way talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when they players fully reveal their information; however, they achieve higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Battle of the sexes Private information Cheap talk Coordination |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12353 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541163 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | [unavailable]. DP12353 Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information. 2017. |
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