| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12355 |
| DP12355 Profit Sharing and Incentives | |
| Emre Ozdenoren | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-06 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model a firm as a team production process subject to moral hazard and derive the optimal profit sharing scheme between productive workers and outside investors together with incentive contracts based on noisy performance signals. More productive agents with noisier performance signals are more likely to receive shares which can explain why managers are motivated by shares, and law or consulting firms form partnerships. A firm that grows by opening branches is held almost entirely by outside investors when its output noise grows faster than the number of branches. Otherwise, insiders hold substantial amount of a large firm’s shares. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12355 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541165 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emre Ozdenoren. DP12355 Profit Sharing and Incentives. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Emre Ozdenoren]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Emre Ozdenoren]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Emre Ozdenoren]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
