| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12361 |
| DP12361 Busy Directors: Strategic Interaction and Monitoring Synergies | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist; Konrad Raff | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-10-10 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We derive conditions for when having a "busy" director on the board is harmful to shareholders and when it is beneficial. Our model allows directors to condition their monitoring choices on their co-directors' choices and to experience positive or negative monitoring synergies across firms. Whether busyness benefits or harms shareholders depends on whether directors' effort choices are strategic substitutes or complements and on the sign of the cross-firm synergies. Our empirical analysis exploits plausibly exogenous shocks that make directors busier on one board and examines how this spills over to other boards. Our results suggest that monitoring efforts typically are strategic complements, except when a firm finds itself facing a crisis. Consistent with the model, we find that busy directors increase monitoring at spillover firms when synergies are positive (which we show increases expected firm value) and reduce monitoring at spillover firms when synergies are negative (which we show reduces expected firm value). |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Boards of directors Busy directors Monitoring |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12361 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541171 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist,Konrad Raff. DP12361 Busy Directors: Strategic Interaction and Monitoring Synergies. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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