全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP12364 Risk-based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP12364
	DP12364 Risk-based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications
	Johannes Spinnewijn; Camille Landais; Arash Nekoei; J Peter Nilsson; David Seim
发表日期	2017-10-11
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	This paper studies whether adverse selection can rationalize a universal mandate for unemployment insurance (UI). Building on a unique feature of the unemployment policy in Sweden, where workers can opt for supplemental UI coverage above a minimum mandate, we provide the first direct evidence for adverse selection in UI and derive its implications for UI design. We find that the unemployment risk is more than twice as high for workers who buy supplemental coverage, even when controlling for a rich set of observables. Exploiting variation in risk and prices to control for moral hazard, we show how this correlation is driven by substantial risk-based selection. Despite the severe adverse selection, we find that mandating the supplemental coverage is dominated by a design leaving the choice to workers. In this design, a large subsidy for supplemental coverage is optimal and complementary to the use of a minimum mandate. Our findings raise questions about the desirability of the universal mandate of generous UI in other countries, which has not been tested before.
主题	Public Economics
关键词	Adverse selection Unemployment insurance Mandate Subsidy
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp12364
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541174
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Johannes Spinnewijn,Camille Landais,Arash Nekoei,et al. DP12364 Risk-based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications. 2017.